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Abstract 
The present study applies a broadly discursive approach to the representation of welfare 
reform and unemployment through an analysis of the deployment of an interpretative 
repertoire of effortfulness in posts to an internet discussion forum.  It is argued that 
when posters construct versions of unemployed people or welfare recipients as 
characterised by ‘laziness’ or lack of ‘effort’ the attribution of responsibility for 
unemployment is frequently not the only piece of discursive business being attended to.  
In addition, posters attend to issues of their own accountability and, significantly, the 
accountability of the government or welfare system itself for the extent to which welfare 
recipients are formally held to account.  It is argued that this approach extends previous 
social psychological work on the explanation of unemployment insofar as it pays 
attention to the context-specific functions performed by such explanations.  Moreover, 
in orienting to the welfare system as having a responsibility to hold welfare recipients to 
account, posters are drawing on a set of discursive resources which essentially treat the 
government of individual psychology as a legitimate function of the welfare system. 
 
Key Words:  DISCOURSE; DISCURSIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; EFFORT; 
EXPLANATIONS; INTERPRETATIVE REPERTOIRES; SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP; 
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The Effortful Citizen:  Discursive Social Psychology and Welfare Reform. 
 
A great deal has been written in recent years about the increasing conditionality 
which the UK Labour Government has placed on welfare benefits, and the assumptions 
regarding human subjectivity that are built into these changes.  Rather less attention has 
been directed at the way in which the commonsense psychological assumptions 
underpinning these changes may be mobilised in everyday discourse on welfare issues.  
The need for such an analysis is particularly pressing given the assumptions about 
popular consciousness apparent in contemporary political discourse on welfare reform.  
The present paper utilises the analytic tools developed by discursive approaches to 
social psychology in order to begin to sketch some of the ways in which constructions 
of individual psychology can be used to perform particular rhetorical functions in 
relation to welfare, and in so doing to point to ways in which a broadly discursive 
approach might be able to add to existing social psychological and social policy 
analyses. 
 
Welfare Reform 
The UK welfare state has, since its inception, been held as the practical political 
manifestation of social citizenship – that component of citizenship which accords that 
individuals have certain social needs guaranteed by the state (cf. Marshall, 1950/1992).  
Although the welfare state has always been contributory in nature – and therefore social 
citizenship has always involved individuals meeting certain obligations in order that the 
welfare state should function (Rees, 1995) – since coming to power in 1997, the UK 
New Labour government have sought to accentuate the responsibilization of 
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individuals, whereby welfare rights have been made increasingly contingent upon 
individuals meeting certain obligations (see e.g. Clarke, 2005; Dwyer, 2000, 2004; 
Lister, 2002; Lund, 1999).  For example, in 2002 the entitlement to unemployment 
benefit – and indeed to a range of other benefits – was made contingent upon the 
individual attending regular meetings with an adviser at Job Centre Plus (Dwyer, 2004).  
Such measures reflect Giddens’s (1998, p. 65) ‘motto’ for third way politics of ‘no 
rights without responsibilities’ (italics in original) and Gordon Brown’s call for a ‘new 
politics founded on responsibilities as well as rights’ (British Broadcasting Corporation, 
2006).  Indeed, the recurrent emphasis on responsibilization in political discourse points 
to the assumption of a deficit of discourses of responsibility in popular consciousness, 
and reinforces the message identified by Lister (2002, p. 127) that paid employment 
constitutes New Labour’s ‘supreme citizenship responsibility’. 
Several commentators have suggested that New Labour’s welfare reform agenda 
is characterised by a concern for individual morality (e.g. Fairclough, 2000; Heron & 
Dwyer, 1999).  For example, Heron and Dwyer (1999) quote Frank Field, the former 
Minister for Welfare Reform, expressing concern for the ‘cancerous impact that much 
of welfare has on people’s motivations’ (p. 98).  Heron and Dwyer rightly point to 
Field’s concern for moral issues here, but for present purposes it is significant that Field 
refers specifically to the psychological term ‘motivations.’  Rose (1999, p. 265) has 
drawn attention to the links between psychology, morality and responsibilization in 
advanced liberal politics, arguing that ‘[p]overty and many other social ills are cast not 
in economic terms but as fundamentally subjective conditions.  This is not a 
psychological subjectivity with social determinants, as in welfare regimes.  It is an 
ethical subjectivity, and a cultural subjectivity.  For community requires all to act by the 
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ethics of virtuous self-responsibility, responsibility for oneself as a member of one’s 
community.’  However, although some authors have explored the way in which welfare 
policy has embodied certain assumptions about human nature and behaviour (e.g. 
Deacon & Mann, 1999; Le Grand, 1997), there is as yet no exploration of the role of 
constructions of the psychological, and the use of specific psychological terms, in 
everyday discourse about welfare.  In the present paper, I want to argue that social 
actors can use psychological terms in order to deal with issues of accountability on 
several levels in relation to welfare.  It will be argued that such usages appear to be 
contingent upon mundane assumptions regarding individual responsibility for ‘making 
an effort’, and the straightforward nature of making such an effort.  However, these 
versions of individual psychology are not constructed solely to hold individuals to 
account, but also function to hold government to account for failing to formally hold 
individuals to account.  In order to do this, a position informed by discursive approaches 
to social psychology will be adopted.  However, before outlining some relevant features 
of discursive social psychology, it is necessary to briefly review a tradition of social 
psychological research which has explored the everyday explanation of unemployment 
and attitudes to welfare. 
 
Attribution, unemployment and welfare 
 In a series of studies in the 1980s, Furnham and his colleagues sought to 
understand beliefs about unemployment and welfare through the application of the 
insights of attribution theories and a broader concern with everyday explanations (e.g. 
Furnham, 1982a, b, 1983; Furnham & Hesketh, 1989; Lewis, Snell & Furnham, 1987; 
Payne & Furnham, 1990).  There is insufficient space here to review this work fully (see 
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Furnham, 2001; Giron, 2001), or to do justice to its many merits.  Instead, a brief review 
of some indicative findings is instructive as to the features of this work.  Furnham 
(1982a) identified three broad classes of explanations for unemployment in Britain:  
Individualistic, societal and fatalistic (luck or chance).  It was found that unemployed 
people in Britain tended to favour societal and fatalistic explanations for unemployment 
to a greater extent than employed people.  Individualistic explanations were not rated 
particularly highly by either group, but were associated with political conservatism, a 
finding supported by Feather (1985) with an Australian sample.  In further studies 
Furnham (1982b) found that people who scored highly on a measure of Protestant work 
ethic beliefs tended to favour individualistic explanations for unemployment, and 
Furnham (1983, p. 147) found that employed people tended to endorse negative 
attitudes towards unemployed people in receipt of social security benefits as being 
characterised by a ‘lack of effort in trying to obtain jobs’.  Finally, Furnham (1985) 
found that conservatism and Protestant work ethic beliefs were associated with negative 
attitudes towards social security claimants. 
These studies are particularly pertinent to the present research given that most of 
them concentrate on the British context, and moreover provide a fascinating insight into 
people’s willingness to endorse a range of explanations of unemployment and attitude 
items relating to welfare at a time of relatively high unemployment.  In particular, the 
frequent presence of explanations involving psychological terms such as ‘effort’ and 
‘motivation’ in these studies points to the importance of commonsense assumptions 
concerning psychology in explanations of unemployment and attitudes towards welfare 
and welfare recipients.  However, research interest in this area declined during the 
1990s, something which lead Giron (2001, p. 152) to ask ‘is unemployment out of 
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fashion for scientists?’  Moreover, since this research was conducted, it is not only the 
social and economic landscape of the UK which has changed – social psychological 
approaches to attribution and explanation have also evolved (see e.g. Antaki, 1994; 
Langdridge & Butt, 2004).  Notwithstanding the merits of Furnham’s work, it is 
vulnerable to the general re-specification of attribution outlined by Discursive 
Psychologists insofar as it neglects the fundamentally constructive and action-oriented 
nature of discourse (cf. Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  Specifically, it frequently involves 
the abstraction of explanations and attributions from the context of their occurrence and 
presents participants with pre-defined response alternatives.  In doing so, the way in 
which attributions and explanations are bound up with issues of accountability are 
neglected (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993; and see below), and on the rare occasions 
when open-ended responses are collected (e.g. Lewis et al., 1987; see also Flanagan & 
Tucker, 1999), there is a tendency to treat language as a straightforward reflection of 
underlying beliefs rather than as a means of constructing social reality and performing 
specific context-bound actions.  Moreover, the concern to identify people’s general 
beliefs about the causes of unemployment results in the neglect of the ways in which 
explanations of unemployment may be worked up as part of specific social practices.  A 
perspective derived from discursive approaches to social psychology points to the 
importance of analysing particular instances without attempting to discern individuals’ 
attributional style, or general tendencies to explain unemployment in a given way.  The 
next section outlines some relevant features of this approach. 
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Discursive Social Psychology 
The approach adopted in the present paper draws on the insights of social 
psychological Discourse Analysis (DA; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 1998; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and the related Discursive Psychology (DP; Edwards, 1997; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 2007a) and Rhetorical Psychology (Billig, 1991, 1996; 
Billig et al., 1988; and see Potter, 2007b, for an overview of discursive work in 
psychology).  For the sake of simplicity, and to reflect the social psychological focus of 
the present analysis, I will refer to this approach as Discursive Social Psychology (DSP; 
see Potter, 1998).  Without wishing to gloss over important distinctions between 
different shades of discursive work, it is useful to summarise some core principles of 
DSP.  In short, DSP involves the re-framing of social psychological questions away 
from a concern with what may or may not be happening ‘under the skull’.  Instead, 
advocates of DSP typically argue for a focus on the ways in which social psychological 
topics and concerns are managed in discourse by social actors themselves (or 
‘members’, to use the ethnomethodological term).  Rather than seeing psychological 
concepts such as memory, attitudes, motivations, attribution and emotions as 
unobservable mental processes which can be inferred from linguistic behaviour, DSP 
sees such concepts as constructed in discourse in order to attend to some context-
specific discursive business. 
Given this brief sketch of the principles of DSP, it is worth outlining in more 
detail some of the analytic concepts which are of particular use for the present analysis.  
As already suggested, the concern of some versions of DSP to explore the functions of 
psychological terms is of particular interest here, as is the pervasiveness of matters of 
accountability in discourse, and the analytic drawing of inferences regarding ideological 
 9 
or cultural themes, which are explored here through the identification of an 
interpretative repertoire.  These features will be briefly outlined in turn. 
 
Psychological terms are central to much discursive work insofar as it follows ‘the 
ethnomethodological injunction to treat (what cognitivists take to be) mental objects as 
things whose ‘reality’ is their invocation in whatever human activities they appear in’ 
(Condor & Antaki, 1997, p. 338, italics in original).  As an example, consider the 
following brief extract from Edwards’s (1995, p. 332) data from a relationship 
counselling session, in which a man, Jimmy, draws attention to the length of his wife’s 
skirt:  ‘Connie had a short skirt on I don’t know’.  Rather than treating the denial of 
knowledge (I don’t know) as indicating a report of a mental state, Edwards shows how 
this formulation performs important interactional business in that it ‘works to counter 
any notion of a watchful and suspicious jealousy’ (p. 333). 
 
Accountability is a pervasive feature of discourse (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  Social 
actors are frequently engaged in managing issues of responsibility – both their own and 
that of other people or institutions – in talk and writing.  It is here that links to 
attribution theories are clearly evident – where the attribution of responsibility is at 
stake, issues of accountability are central (Antaki, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 
1993).  Furthermore, discursive research has identified a variety of ways in which social 
actors orient to psychological issues, and use psychological terms, to attribute and 
disclaim responsibility in situations where accountability is at stake (e.g. Buttny, 1993). 
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Ideological or cultural themes:  The appropriateness of moving from a concern with 
how social actors themselves draw inferences (and make inferences available) in 
discourse to an analytic drawing of inferences concerning ideological or cultural themes 
has been the subject of extended debate in DSP and related approaches (e.g. Schegloff, 
1997; Wetherell, 1998; Wooffitt, 2005; and the debates following Sims-Schouten, Riley 
& Willig, 2007 and Speer, 2001).  It is not my intention to rehearse these debates here, 
but it is nevertheless important to point out that the present analysis proceeds from the 
assumption that in dealing with specific instances of situated discourse and discursive 
psychological matters, we are also dealing with the themes of commonsense, something 
which Billig et al. (1988, p. 28) have termed ‘lived ideology’.  Moreover, psychological 
terms themselves may constitute discursive resources within particular ‘lived 
ideologies.’  The approach adopted here, then, shares Wetherell’s (2003, p. 13) aim of 
identifying the ‘cultural resources’ used in discourse.  As will become apparent, these 
‘cultural resources’ may include assumptions about the psychological, and the use of 
psychological terms themselves.  There are several techniques for the identification of 
such cultural resources in DP, three particularly influential analytic concepts being 
interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas and subject positions (see Edley, 2001, 
for a comparison).  The present analysis will draw primarily on the concept of 
interpretative repertoires. 
 
Interpretative repertoires were defined by Potter & Wetherell (1987, p.149) as 
‘recurrently used systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events 
and other phenomena’, and are one of the central analytic concepts of social 
psychological DA (see also Potter, Wetherell, Gill & Edwards, 1990; Wetherell & 
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Potter, 1988; cf. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984).  Although, as Potter (2007c) has recently 
pointed out, a focus on interpretative repertoires is less a feature of current work in DP, 
they remain central to much discursive work addressing social psychological issues (e.g. 
Croghan & Miell, 1999; Lawes, 1999; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003; Reynolds, 
Wetherell & Taylor, 2007; Riley, 2002). 
 
The present analysis applies the insights of DSP in order to explore the ways in which 
an interpretative repertoire of effortfulness is used in addressing issues of accountability 
in relation to un/employment.  The aim is not to suggest that all social actors in all 
contexts are somehow constrained by an individualistic discourse of ‘effort’ in relation 
to social citizenship – alternative explanations of unemployment in terms of social 
forces (e.g. Dean, 2004; Edelman, 1977) or fatalism (e.g. Furnham, 1982a) are clearly 
possible.  Indeed, Gibson (2007) has shown how, in adolescents’ research interview talk 
the effortfulness repertoire was associated with in-principle questioning concerning 
un/employment rights and responsibilities, whereas in another context interviewees 
drew upon an alternative repertoire of immigration as a cause of unemployment.  
However, the aim of the present paper is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
welfare discourse, but to sketch the discursive features of invocations of the 
‘effortfulness’ repertoire in one specific discursive context – an internet forum in which 
individuals post comments on issues in the news – related to what might broadly be 
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termed welfare reform
1
 or social citizenship.  In particular, the analysis draws attention 
to the way in which ‘effortfulness’ is used not only to attribute individual responsibility 
for unemployment, but also to manage the accountability of the posters themselves and 
to hold the welfare system or government to account for the extent to which people who 
do not display ‘effort’ are formally held to account.  In so doing, it is hoped to illustrate 
the utility of a qualitative analysis informed by DSP for studies of welfare and social 
citizenship, and to highlight the importance of rekindling social psychological interest 
in ordinary accounts of unemployment. 
 
Data & Analytic Procedure 
Data 
The materials that form the dataset for the present analysis come from a debate 
on the BBC news website.  The debate coincided with the release of the Freud (2007) 
report on the future of the UK welfare system and is part of an ongoing feature entitled 
‘Have Your Say’ in which readers of the website are invited to post comments 
addressing significant issues in the news.
2
  The debate used for the present analysis was 
headed with the question ‘Is the welfare system working?’ and began on 4th March 2007 
                                                 
1
 At this point, it is worth noting Fairclough’s (2000) observation that the term ‘reform’ 
itself performs an important ideological function insofar as it is suggestive of a 
progressive, forward-thinking process of change. 
2
 See 
http://newsforums.bbc.co.uk/nol/thread.jspa?threadID=5675&&&&edition=1&ttl=2007
0730162708.  Retrieved 25
th
 September, 2007.  Quotations reproduced by permission of 
the BBC.  
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at 9.48 GMT.  A copy of the full introduction to the debate is reproduced in Appendix 
1.  According to the information available on the website, a total of 3319 comments 
were posted, with 2698 comments being published on the website.  More information 
regarding the running of the debate can be found on the website itself.  For the purposes 
of the current analysis, a subset of 183 comments were selected on the basis of what are 
known as ‘reader recommendations’.  This function of the website allows readers to 
recommend a comment contributed by someone else.  The website displays the number 
of recommendations for each comment, and in order to provide a manageable dataset a 
cut-off point of a minimum of 10 recommendations was used for the present analysis. 
 Selecting the data in this way may ordinarily raise issues regarding the removal 
of posts from the sequential turn-taking context in which they were posted.  
Specifically, recent research points to the importance of recipient design and turn-taking 
in online contexts (e.g. Antaki, Ardévol, Núñez & Vayreda, 2006).  However, the ‘Have 
Your Say’ forum does not allow posters to reply to previous posts directly.  Instead all 
posters simply post a comment which appears in the general ‘thread’ of comments.  
This is not to suggest that recipient design is not a feature of the comments – as will 
become clear below, many posts are constructed in such a way as to manage the way in 
which they might be received.  However, the design of the forum makes an explicit 
focus on sequential turn-taking itself inappropriate for the present study. 
 A brief note on ethical issues is also appropriate at this point.  In the recent 
British Psychological Society (BPS) guidelines on the use of the internet for research 
purposes, researchers are cautioned that ‘it is strongly arguable that postings to both 
synchronous or asynchronous discussion groups … do not automatically count as public 
activity’ (BPS, 2007, p. 3).  However, in the present case, it is notable that the ‘Have 
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Your Say’ forum is freely available and is not password protected.  Nor is the forum 
hosted by a specific special interest website where posters might reasonably expect to 
be reaching a small, well-defined audience (see e.g. Brownlow & O’Dell, 2002).  In 
contrast, the nature of the BBC – the organization hosting the forum – makes it perhaps 
one of the most self-evidently public forums one might engage in on the internet.  
Certainly, the posts are being analysed by an academic researcher – something that the 
posters no doubt did not intend to happen to their comments – but in this respect the 
comments can be seen as analogous to ‘letters to the editor’ published in traditional 
print media, which have frequently been used in qualitative research (e.g. Lynn & Lea, 
2003; Richardson, 2001).  Nevertheless, in the interest of maintaining anonymity as far 
as possible, the comments reproduced in the present paper are presented minus 
identifying information such as the name and location of the poster. 
 
Analytic Procedure 
 After initial reading of the data suggested that many posters of comments drew 
on themes of effort, laziness and hard work, the analytic corpus of 183 comments was 
coded for uses of terms referring to individual effort – the effortfulness repertoire.  This 
yielded data from 55 comments.  The effortfulness repertoire included any terms or 
figures of speech which referred to lack of effort or laziness, such as lazy/laziness, 
work-shy, idle/idleness, feckless, layabouts, work ethic, as well as effort itself, and 
references to hard work, people who can’t be bothered and a cluster of figurative terms 
which evoke an image of people sitting or lying down, such as references to people sat 
around or, more colloquially, lying around on their backsides.  References to spongers, 
scroungers and parasites were also included on the basis that these terms were used to 
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construct people as willing to receive an income without working for it.  Each 
individual comment was analysed as a whole – although only one line in a comment 
might draw upon the effortfulness repertoire it was considered in the context of the 
functions it performed in relation to the comment as a whole.  The decision to 
characterise this repertoire as one of effortfulness (rather than, for example, laziness) 
was made as effort can be used in both a positive or negative sense (i.e. one can ‘make 
an effort’ or ‘lack effort’).  This reflects the way in which the repertoire itself was used 
not only to construct groups of people as lazy or work shy, but also to contrast these 
groups with hard working people – both are examples of the repertoire, not simply those 
which refer to an absence of effort, and both are therefore of interest in the present 
analysis. 
 Analysis proceeded in accordance with the principles of DSP (as outlined 
above), together with supplementary techniques such as the method of constant 
comparison (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and deviant case analysis (see e.g. Seale, 
1999). 
 
Analysis 
 In the social psychological literature on ordinary explanations of unemployment, 
a lack of effort tends to be offered as the exemplar par excellence of an individualistic 
explanation for unemployment.  Similarly, in the present dataset individuals were 
frequently held to account for ‘laziness’ or for being ‘work-shy’.  For example:3 
                                                 
3
 In all the comments presented here, punctuation and spelling is reproduced as in the 
original.  All comments are reproduced in full, except for information regarding date 
and time of posting, name and location of poster, and number of recommendations. 
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Comment 1:  ‘bone idle bull’ 
Being a parent is not a job, its a choice..... and yes, I am the parent of 3 kids 
(now 12, 14, 18), and both my wife and I have worked (without claiming 
benefits) since they began all school. 
Ive never heard so much bone idle bull as all the listed excuses to be jobless and 
sponging off the state. 
Stop watching mind numbing daytime TV at my expense and get a job. 
 
 
It should be apparent from this comment that, in line with the general DP approach to 
issues of attribution and accountability (Edwards & Potter, 1992; 1993), it is not only 
other people’s responsibility for unemployment which is at stake here.  Equally, the 
poster attends to issues of his own accountability by claiming category entitlement to 
comment on how to avoid unemployment by constructing his (and his wife’s) status as 
working parents.  However, in attending to issues of his own accountability he is also 
setting out grounds for holding others to account.  He works up a contrast between 
himself and his wife as working parents and a category of people who are ‘sponging off 
the state’.  The latter’s accounts for unemployment are dismissed as ‘bone idle bull … 
excuses’, before glossing the defining activity of this category of people as ‘watching 
mind numbing daytime TV’, and instructing them to ‘get a job’.  This category of 
people are constructed in such a way as to be both responsible for their own 
unemployment and unwilling to seek employment.  Furthermore, employment itself is 
constructed as relatively unproblematic and easy to obtain – the implication being that 
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provided one stops watching ‘mind numbing daytime TV’, finding a job should be 
fairly straightforward. 
However, comments which were limited simply to holding individuals to 
account were relatively rare (N = 7).  The ‘effortfulness’ repertoire was also used for 
commenting on, or suggesting improvements to, the welfare system.  Such comments 
frequently took the form of explicit statements regarding the welfare system (N = 24). 
For example: 
 
Comment 2:  ‘all these lazy people!’ 
I think Britain's welfare state is a complete joke. Hardworking, honest, tax 
paying people like myself continually subsidising all these lazy people! I am 
sick of it! 
I have been working full time, non stop since finishing my education in 1981, if 
I can do it, so can everybody else!! (and, I never got pregnant!) 
My only exception is the genuinely "disabled" 
 
In this comment, the poster mobilises a similar contrast to the poster in comment 1.  A 
distinction is drawn between ‘[h]ardworking, honest, tax paying people like myself’ and 
‘all these lazy people’.  Attending to issues of her own accountability raised by her 
positioning of herself in the ‘hardworking’ category, she then provides a description of 
her own working history.  This is worked up through the use of an Extreme Case 
Formulation (ECF; Pomerantz, 1986) (non stop) and the provision of detail (in 1981), 
and provides a basis for her subsequent claim that ‘if I can do it, so can everybody else!’  
Here we have society constructed as consisting of two groups of people defined by their 
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enduring characteristics – the hardworking (who are also honest taxpayers), and the 
lazy.  Nevertheless, the route from the latter group to the former is treated as 
straightforward, with no reason why ‘everybody’ cannot do as the poster has.  The 
speaker makes an exception of people who are ‘genuinely “disabled”’, thereby orienting 
to the possibility that some people’s claims to disability may not be ‘genuine’, which 
draws implicitly on a genuine-bogus distinction familiar from research on the 
representation of asylum seekers (e.g. Lynn & Lea, 2003).  As in comment 1, working 
hard or making an effort is treated as a mundane activity which (almost) anyone should 
be able to do.  However, in addition to attending to matters of her own accountability 
and holding individuals to account for being ‘lazy’, a third level of accountability is 
attended to here.  The poster’s opening sentence (I think Britain’s welfare state is a 
complete joke) marks her comment as a criticism of the welfare system itself.  It is 
hardly surprising that such criticisms appear in a debate in which contributors were 
explicitly asked to comment on the welfare system, yet what is significant is the way in 
which the construction of individuals as responsible for their own status as either lazy or 
hardworking is used to hold the system itself to account.  In effect, then, the system is a 
‘joke’ because it fails to hold individuals to account when they do not meet their 
responsibilities. 
Posters also sometimes drew on the effortfulness repertoire in suggesting 
alternatives to the present system (N = 11).  For example: 
 
 Comment 3:  ‘proof of their efforts’ 
Having lived in Canada for many years, those on job seekers allowance must 
show proof of their efforts to find work. They have to provide names of 
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employers that they have visited in their effort to seek employment. Those who 
cannot show proof are denied benefits. They must seek work at companies 
commensurate with their skills. We must do more to force absent fathers to pay 
for their offspring rather than merely expect taxpayers to fund them. 
 
The poster claims entitlement by stating that s/he has ‘lived in Canada for many years’, 
before going on to construct the Canadian system in terms of the requirement for people 
to demonstrate their ‘efforts’ to seek suitable employment as a condition for the receipt 
of welfare benefits.  Unlike comments 1 and 2, the poster does not provide a gloss on 
the character of welfare recipients, yet welfare is nevertheless contingent upon 
individual ‘effort’.  However, we can again see how the welfare system is accorded the 
role of monitoring individual ‘effort’ (by, for example, collecting ‘proof of their 
efforts’).  To the extent that the welfare system does not do this, by implication, it can 
be held to account. 
Finally, the effortfulness repertoire was also used to hold the government at least 
partially accountable for failing to sufficiently hold ‘lazy’ individuals to account (N = 
9).  For example: 
 
Comment 4:  ‘lying around on their backsides’ 
The sad thing is that we all know the money will be taken off the geniune cases 
while the wasters of this country continue to bleed it dry while lying around on 
their backsides. We must all like what is happening. A government is meant to 
be representative of its people, never has this been further from the truth. It's 
 20 
important for you all to do what you can to survive, do not lie but volunteer 
nothing. It's them and us. 
 
Comment 5:  ‘idle morons’ 
My girlfriend works at a sixth form college and time after time after time she 
hears comments from female students, such as, 'If I get pregnant, I'll get a 
house.' 
Here's an idea: Use contraception and try working for a living!!  
It's far too easy for idle morons to be dished out benefits and housing, while 
genuine, hardworking individuals save hard for what they have. The government 
needs to toughen up! Good on you, Mr Blair! 
 
In comment 4, the poster draws a distinction between ‘genuine cases’ and ‘wasters’, the 
latter being characterised as ‘lying around on their backsides’ and as continuing to 
‘bleed it [the country] dry’.  The temporal reference to continuity, coupled with the 
earlier suggestion that ‘we all know’ what the outcome of any attempt to change the 
welfare system will be, constructs the situation as enduring and inevitable, something 
which the government is held accountable for due to its failure to be ‘representative of 
its people’.  By contrast, in comment 5, the government, and specifically the then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, is applauded for their plans to change the welfare system.  
However, the ‘effortfulness’ repertoire is used to do similar discursive work:  The 
welfare system as it currently stands is criticised for dishing out ‘benefits and housing’ 
to ‘idle morons’, a category of people who are contrasted with ‘genuine, hardworking 
individuals’.  Note again the way in which the poster attends to issues of personal 
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accountability by prefacing his invocation of ‘idle morons’ with a description of his 
girlfriend’s experiences.  This description makes use of a number of devices for the 
construction of factuality (Potter, 1996), such as the use of repetition (time after time 
after time) which exhibits a three part structure (Jefferson, 1990), reported speech (see 
e.g. Holt, 1996), and the construction of a reliable identity for the source of these 
reported remarks (Pomerantz, 1984).  The source is described as holding a relevant 
position (works in a sixth form college) and as being in a relationship of trust with the 
poster (My girlfriend).  These devices serve to provide a basis for his subsequent claims 
– they are based on the experiences of a trusted other, rather than, for example, any 
prejudicial sentiment on the part of the poster.  In addition, the use of these devices 
suggests that characterising people as ‘idle morons’ is not in itself a straightforward 
activity – as in many discursive arenas social actors may need to attend to the possibility 
that such remarks may not elicit agreement from recipients, but lead to inferences about 
the character of the speaker, or in this case poster.  Unlike in comment 4, the poster 
applauds the government’s plans, but the effortfulness repertoire is again used to hold 
individuals to account, and, more specifically, to position them as accountable to 
government.  By implication then, the government itself can be held to account if it is 
not seen to be holding ‘idle morons’ to account. 
Comments 1-5 have in common the assumption that the right to receive welfare 
benefits should be denied to those who are ‘lazy’ or who do not display ‘effort’.  
However, lest it be suggested that this analysis reveals some kind of pervasive 
discursive false consciousness from which ordinary social actors are unable to break 
free, there were eleven comments in which posters themselves explicitly took issue with 
the construction of welfare recipients as ‘lazy’ or ‘work shy’, or as not ‘genuinely trying 
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to find work’.  These are worthy of close attention insofar as they provide opportunities 
to identify cases which may help to identify the limits of the analytic points presented 
thus far.  Analysis of these cases suggests that many of these in fact exemplify the 
general observations outlined above.  For example: 
 
 Comment 6:  ‘“lazy” or “work shy”’ 
The amount of contempt I see here for those who are genuinely unable to work 
is sickening. We're not a civilised country at all, we stopped being a civilised 
society when Mrs Thatcher created such a selfish and egotistical society. Just 
look at the ignorant comments here! Everybody is presuming that all benefit 
claimants are either "lazy" or "work shy". 
Will my comment be posted? Probably not, as not to offend the "it's all about 
me" type. 
This forum is insulting to the chronically ill. 
 
As mentioned above, the nature of the ‘Have Your Say’ forum precludes posters from 
responding directly to previous comments as part of a ‘thread’, however, this comment 
is instructive about the way in which the sorts of formulations represented by comments 
1-5 were received by some other posters.  The poster links the use of the terms ‘lazy’ 
and ‘work shy’ to the existence of a ‘selfish and egotistical society’, responsibility for 
which is attributed to former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.  The use of quotation 
marks helps the poster to indicate that the terms ‘lazy’ and ‘work shy’ are being 
mentioned rather than used (see Garver, 1965, on the origins of this distinction; and see 
Potter & Litton, 1985, for its relevance to social psychology and discourse).  Note also 
 23 
the use of ECFs in the sentence ‘Everybody is presuming that all benefit claimants are 
either “lazy” or “work shy”.’  The presumption is attributed to every poster participating 
in the debate, and is said to apply to all claimants – this presents the poster’s view as a 
corrective which goes against the prevailing consensus.  The poster’s rhetorical strategy 
involves the construction of a group of people who are ‘genuinely unable to work’ (later 
glossed as the ‘chronically ill’) in order to challenge those posters (every other poster) 
who dismiss all benefit claimants as ‘lazy’ or ‘work shy’.  However, the underlying 
assumptions here are not too different from those apparent in the other comments.  As 
in comments 2 and 4, many posters constructed categories of ‘disabled’ or ‘genuine’ 
claimants who were exempted from charges of ‘laziness’, and thereby treated as 
legitimate welfare recipients.  This is precisely what the poster in comment 6 is doing, 
albeit with a difference in emphasis:  Not all claimants are ‘lazy’ or ‘work shy’, some 
are ‘genuinely unable to work’ and/or ‘chronically ill’ and are thereby entitled to 
receive benefits.  The implicit assumption remains:  Anyone who is not ‘genuinely 
unable to work’ may well be ‘lazy’ and therefore not entitled to welfare. 
Another type of case which ultimately provides support for the analysis involves 
comments in which posters challenge the assumption that welfare recipients are ‘lazy’ 
by referring explicitly to their own circumstances.  For example: 
 
Comment 7:  ‘Does that make me a layabout’ 
I work harder now that I’m on benefits than I ever did when I was in full time 
employment. 
The reason? 
I’m a full time carer for my disabled wife. 
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I would dearly love to go back to work, but if I did, my wife would suffer. 
Does that make me a layabout, a sponger, or a benefit cheat? 
You decide. 
 
In this comment the poster’s construction of himself as ‘work[ing] harder’ now that he 
is receiving welfare benefits than when he was in paid employment is used to challenge 
the construction of welfare recipients in terms of laziness (through the use of the 
colloquial term ‘layabout’).  However, the assumption that one’s income should be 
dependent upon effortful labour of some kind is again apparent in the very terms in 
which he constructs himself (I work harder…).  This poster is again criticising a 
tendency to treat all benefit claimants as ‘layabouts’, not the assumption that one’s right 
to an income is ordinarily dependent upon one’s engagement in effortful labour.  
Furthermore, the poster orients to a norm of engaging in paid employment (I would 
dearly love to go back to work), and the responsibility of individuals to do so.  
However, by positioning himself as a caring husband he is able to argue his exemption 
from this responsibility by invoking a greater responsibility to his wife (if I did, my wife 
would suffer). 
It is worth considering one final case in which the effortfulness repertoire is used 
without any apparent attribution of responsibility to individuals: 
 
Comment 8:  ‘get off their backsides for £200 per week’
4
 
You can't expect people to get off their backsides for £200 per week (before tax 
and n.i.). I wouldn't, why should I expect somebody else to? People would be 
                                                 
4
 The reference to ‘n.i’ in this comment refers to National Insurance contributions. 
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bringing home around £165 per week and are supposed to pay their rent, council 
tax, food, utility bills, travel to work etc. Impossible. Tax credits are nonsense. 
Just pay people enough money to live on. 
 
This comment stands out from the others insofar as the poster orients to a responsibility 
on the part of employers and the state to ensure that paid work provides individuals with 
a living wage, rather than the responsibility of individuals to engage in paid work.  
Underscoring this is a treatment of an individual’s decision to engage in paid 
employment as the outcome of a rational calculation, rather than as a moral obligation.  
In this sense, then, this comment constitutes a ‘deviant case’:  The effortfulness 
repertoire is not being used to deal with moral issues concerning the deservingness of 
welfare recipients.  However, although the use to which the effortfulness repertoire is 
put differs, the commonsense psychological assumptions underlying its use have more 
in common with previous posts than may at first be apparent.  As with other posts, 
people ‘get[ting] off their backsides’ is treated as a relatively straightforward and 
unproblematic activity which is under the control of autonomous individuals.  Indeed, 
the construction of a rational actor making a considered choice concerning whether or 
not to engage in paid employment actually echoes other comments in which welfare 
recipients were constructed as having made a choice, and held accountable for it (e.g. in 
comment 5 above, where the poster reports overheard conversations).  In this comment 
the poster positions such a decision as rational, understandable and therefore defensible, 
whereas other posters position such a decision as immoral and therefore indefensible.  
The key difference is that here the poster prioritises a rational rather than a moral frame, 
and in so doing is able to shift accountability to employers and the state.  Furthermore, 
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the poster still attends to a norm of engagement in effortful labour, the implication being 
that once a living wage is in place, people can be expected to ‘get off their backsides’. 
 
To summarise, then, ‘making an effort’ is treated as a simple, straightforward activity 
which is, above all, something over which the individual has control.  However, it is not 
the case that the repertoire is only ever used to hold individuals to account.  Instead, the 
welfare system or the government itself can be held accountable insofar as it fails to 
hold these individuals to account.  Thus not only can a lack of ‘effort’ be treated as 
accountable, but a failure to treat a lack of ‘effort’ as accountable can itself be 
accountable.  Equally, as comment 8 shows, employers and the state can be held to 
account for failing to pay wages of a sufficient level such that individuals might be 
expected to (and therefore held accountable for any failure to) ‘get off their backsides’.  
The effortfulness repertoire is therefore used to manage accountability on three levels.  
First, it can be used by individual posters to present themselves as ‘hard working’.  
Second, it can be used to construct people as accountable for the extent to which they 
are ‘lazy’ or ‘make an effort’.  Third, it can be used to hold institutional or systemic 
actors (the welfare system, government or employers) to account. 
 
Discussion 
The discursive critique of attribution theory (Antaki, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 
1992, 1993) has drawn attention to the problems inherent in studying attributions and, 
more broadly, explanations, in isolation from the discursive contexts in which they 
occur.  By moving from an approach which asks people to identify in-principle causes 
of, or explanations for, unemployment, to an approach which explores the way in which 
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one particular type of explanation for unemployment is constructed within the context 
of arguments about welfare reform, the present analysis sacrifices the goal of 
developing general statements regarding how people understand unemployment to 
consider instead the context-specific uses to which explanations of unemployment can 
be put.  Moreover, such an approach allows us to see how in these specific discursive 
settings, more than simply responsibility for unemployment in general might be at 
stake.  Rather, people may attend to issues of their own accountability (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992) – both for what they say/write and for their own employment status – as 
well as constructing particular explanations of unemployment in order to argue for 
particular courses of action on the part of institutional or systemic actors. 
There are clearly other ways of talking about welfare and related issues – it is 
not the case that the effortfulness repertoire represents the way in which welfare and 
unemployment is discursively represented.  To suggest this based on the data presented 
here would be remiss.  However, the aim of the present study was not to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all the possible ways of talking about welfare, but to analyse 
in detail the uses to which one interpretative repertoire was put in one quite specific 
discursive context relating to welfare.  Needless to say, further research will be required 
to extend this analysis in order to show how this – and other – repertoires operate in 
different contexts.  What the uses of the effortfulness repertoire identified here do show, 
however, is that arguments over welfare may be tied up with assumptions concerning 
commonsense psychology.  Whether one should be entitled to receive benefits can be 
treated as being contingent on ‘effort’, and judgments concerning one’s entitlement to 
support are inseparable from judgements concerning whether one possesses undesirable 
character traits such as ‘laziness’, with the assumption being that stopping oneself from 
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being ‘lazy’ is both the responsibility of the individual and relatively straightforward.  
In this sense, then, the repertoire is frequently used to locate responsibility in the 
individual and in so doing inevitably justifies inequalities and unemployment as the 
outcome of a fair and natural process – something akin to saying that you get out what 
you put in. 
Moreover, the present analysis points to the way in which the effortfulness 
repertoire can perform a variety of functions in discursive practice.  In addition to the 
use of effortfulness to locate the cause of unemployment at the level of the individual, 
the repertoire was also central to the management of the accountability of the individual 
poster, and to holding the government or welfare system to account for failing to hold 
individual ‘lazy’ people to account. 
This final use of the effortfulness repertoire – the construction of ‘lazy’ 
unemployed people as a means of holding systemic or institutional actors to account – 
points to a sense in which the welfare system can be treated by social actors themselves 
as a means of governing welfare recipients.  The significance of the posters’ use of the 
effortfulness repertoire lies not only in the assumption of individual responsibility for 
‘making an effort’, but also in the way in which the welfare system and/or the 
government is treated as having a responsibility to police welfare claimants and, 
moreover, to make judgements concerning their levels of effort.  In this sense, then, we 
might say that posters are orienting to the welfare state as a means of governing 
individual psychology.  Income is dependent upon effort, and the welfare system makes 
judgments concerning effort in order to determine the legitimacy of welfare claimants.  
In order for an illegitimate claimant to become legitimate, appropriate levels of effort 
must be displayed and, moreover, individuals themselves are responsible for their levels 
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of effort. Such assumptions have been identified as forming the basis of recent changes 
in welfare regimes (e.g. Rose, 1999), however the present analysis shows how the 
mobilisation of a particular discursive repertoire – effortfulness – suggests that such 
assumptions can be drawn upon in the discourse of social actors themselves.  This is 
significant insofar as recent pronouncements from the UK Labour Government point to 
an assumption that public discourse tends to neglect responsibilities in favour of rights, 
with associated policy initiatives seeking to redress this perceived imbalance.  If, 
however, ordinary social actors have ready access to cultural resources such as the 
effortfulness repertoire, it would seem that norms of individual responsibility are firmly 
culturally entrenched, with those who are perceived to be transgressing these norms 
potentially subject to opprobrium and castigation.  Indeed, it might be suggested that 
official discourse and policy initiatives need to be redressed in the opposite direction, 
with assumptions of individual autonomy and personal responsibility being balanced by 
alternative discourses. 
Rose (1999, p. 267) has suggested that in advanced liberalism ‘citizenship 
becomes conditional upon conduct’ and that, furthermore, for those excluded from 
citizenship ‘control is now to operate through the rational reconstruction of the will’ (p. 
270).  This essentially involves techniques aimed at rectifying the psychological 
deficiencies of those whose conduct fails to reach appropriate standards of autonomy 
and self-responsibility.  Rose’s argument concerns the broad sweep of policies and 
practices which make up advanced liberalism, yet the present analysis suggests that, on 
a much more everyday level, social actors themselves can bring to bear similar 
assumptions regarding autonomy, responsibility and psychology.  Indeed, one might 
suggest that the processes identified by Rose exist in a dialectical relationship with the 
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more mundane cultural resources drawn upon by ordinary social actors.  The way in 
which posters to the ‘Have Your Say’ forum drew on the effortfulness repertoire 
suggests that not only do people have routine access to these cultural resources, but that 
they can use them to call for the very form of governance that Rose identifies – the 
exhortation that the state identify those with ‘pathologies of the will’ (p. 269) and deal 
with them accordingly.  Indeed, the observation that political discourse may involve the 
assumption that members of the populous need to be reminded about their 
responsibilities is rather striking in light of the seemingly mundane way in which social 
actors themselves orient to such responsibilities.  In effect, government is echoing 
popular discourse in calling for a rebalancing of rights and responsibilities, while 
constructing a version of popular sentiment as lacking a discourse of responsibility. 
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Appendix 1:  Introduction to the ‘Have Your Say’ debate headed ‘Is the welfare system 
working?’ 
(http://newsforums.bbc.co.uk/nol/thread.jspa?threadID=5675&&&&edition=1&ttl=200
70730162708; retrieved 25
th
 September, 2007) 
 
Is the welfare system working? 
The benefits system should be overhauled to get people back into work, a government-
commissioned report says.  
Welfare payments will be conditional on looking for work and businesses and charities 
will be offered cash incentives to get people off benefits and back into employment.  
Under the new reforms, parents could be made to seek work when their child turns 12, 
rather than 16, if they want to receive benefits.  
Is the current welfare system working? Should people on benefits be forced back to 
work? Is it the responsibility of the individual, society or the government to get people 
back into work? 
 
